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"In these uncertain times, we must tread carefully when
balancing our need for national security with our rights as
individuals. This case is fraught with danger .. .
I.

INTRODUCTION

An inherent tension exists between our country's national
security and the fundamental freedoms of U.S. citizens.
Specifically, this tension is the difficulty, if not impossibility, of
reconciling the need to fight and prevent terrorism with the need
to uphold the basic values of a free society.2 One can easily
comprehend such tension when considering one of the most
controversial national security issues of the twenty-first century: the
scope of the President's authority to detain individuals as enemy
combatants. 3 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
addressed this issue in al-Marri v. Pucciarelli.4 In al-Marri, a 5-4
majority held that the President is congressionally authorized to
order the indefinite military detention of civilians who are captured
in the United States.5
On September 10, 2001, Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, a Qatari
national and a legal resident of the United States, lawfully entered
the United States with his wife and children. 6 The following day, al

1. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 276 (4th Cir. 2008) (Traxler, J.,
concurring), vacated sub nom. al-Marri v. Spagone, No. 08-368, 2009 WL 564940
(U.S. Mar. 6, 2009) (mem.).
2. See Ten Questions on National Security, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5007, 5076
(2008).
3. Gregory H. Shill, Enemy Combatants and a Challenge to the Separation of War
Powers in al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007), 31 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
393, 393 (2008). Once the Government detains an individual whom it properly
labeled as an "enemy combatant" in the war on terror, the Government contends
that he is not entitled to prisoner-of-war (POW) status or the protections of the
Constitution. Deva Solomon, Note, Can Government Indefinitely Detain Individuals
Accused of BeingEnemy Combatants?, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 5155, 5157-58 (2008).
While the scope of the enemy-combatant category is controversial today, the
practice of militarily detaining enemy combatants actually predates the
Constitution. SeeExparteQuirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942) ("Such was the practice of
our own military authorities before the adoption of the Constitution, and during
the Mexican and Civil Wars.").
4. 534 F.3d at 216-17.
5. Id. at 216.
6. See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
19, al-Marri ex rel. Berman v.
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Qaeda perpetrated horrific terrorist attacks on American soil. As
part of the Government's investigation of the 9/11 attacks, the FBI
arrested al-Marri nearly three months later as a material witness.7
Thereafter, the Government imprisoned al-Marri and eventually
charged him with several federal criminal offenses."
In June 2003, less than a month before al-Marri's criminal trial,
President George W. Bush signed an order in which he stated that
al-Marri "is, and at the time he entered the United States in
September 2001 was, an enemy combatant."9 In light of this
declaration, the Government successfully moved to dismiss the
pending criminal indictment, transferred al-Marri to military
custody, and transported him to the Naval Consolidated Brig in
Charleston, South Carolina. 0 Al-Marri has remained in military
custody ever since."
Today, al-Marri is the only person on the American mainland
known to be held as an enemy combatant. 2 On July 15, 2008, the
Fourth Circuit 3 sitting en banc set forth a fractured decision that
addressed two related issues. 14 First, assuming the truth of the
Government's allegations against al-Marri, did "Congress . .
empower[] the President to detain al-Marri as an enemy
Wright, 443 F. Supp. 2d 774 (D.S.C. 2006) (No. 2:04-2257-HFF). A1-Marri
returned to the United States to pursue a master's degree in Peoria, Illinois, where
he obtained a bachelor's degree in 1991. Id.
7. Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 219 (Motz,J., concurring).
8. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 6,
20, 22-23. The
Government charged al-Marri with possession of counterfeit credit card numbers
with the intent to defraud, making false statements, and using false identification
to influence the action of a federally insured financial institution. Id. 22-23.
9. Official Designation of President George W. Bush (filed June 23, 2003),
available
at
http://news.findlaw.com/nytimes/docs/almarri/usamarri62303ecord.html.
More fully, the President stated that al-Marri is an enemy combatant; that he is
closely associated with al Qaeda; that he engaged in conduct that constituted
hostile and war-like acts, including conduct in preparation for acts of international
terrorism; and that he represents a "continuing, present, and grave danger to the
national security of the United States." Id.
10. Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 255 (Traxler,J., concurring).
11. Id.
12. Adam Liptak, Court Ruling Favors Bush in Powers On Detainees, N.Y. TIMES,
July 16, 2008, at A12. All other individuals whom President Bush has labeled as
"enemy combatants" are detained at Guantanamo Bay. Id.
13. The "closely divided and complex decision" is somewhat surprising given
the Fourth Circuit's reputation as the "nation's most conservative federal appeals
court." Id.
14. After the court's brief per curiam opinion, the additional 210 pages
contain seven opinions. The decision involved nine judges, seven opinions, and

two 5-4 majorities.
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combatant" 15 Second, if the answer to the first issue is yes, has alMarri "been afforded sufficient 16process to challenge his
designation as an enemy combatant"
To ensure sufficient depth in analysis, this note focuses
primarily on the first part of the two-part ruling-that is, the issue
of whether the President has the authority to detain al-Marri as an
enemy combatant.
This note first provides an overview of the Supreme Court's
decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Iv which provided the legal
framework for the Fourth Circuit's decision in al-Marri."8 Next, it
sets forth a comparison of the facts in Hamdi and al-Marri."' It then
examines the Fourth Circuit's decision of al-Marri.20 Lastly, this
note lays out an analysis of that decision, 1 concludes that the
Fourth Circuit's ruling is an unprecedented extension of the
President's authority to detain and improperly exceeds the legal
detention framework set forth in Hamdi,22 and closes with a
discussion of the future of the al-Marricase.
II. HAMDI V. RUMSFELD
While most of the Fourth Circuit judges in al-Marri admitted
that Hamdi does not compel the conclusion that the President has
the authority to detain al-Marri,2 3 the enemy combatant framework
in Hamdi is of utmost importance in any case involving the
President's authority to detain. Accordingly, it is essential to briefly
examine the
examine the facts of the Hamdi case and thoroughly
4
legal framework set forth by the Hamdi Court.1

15. Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 216.
16. Id. As to the due process issue, the second 5-4 majority held that al-Marri
was not afforded constitutionally sufficient process in the district court
proceeding. Id. at 262 (Traxler, J., concurring) ("[D]ue process demands more
procedural safeguards than those provided to al-Marri in the habeas proceedings
below.").
17. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
18. See infra Part II.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part IV.
21.
See infra Part V.
22. See infra Part VI.
23. AI-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 259 (4th Cir. 2008) (Traxler, J.,
concurring), vacated sub nom. al-Marri v. Spagone, No. 08-368, 2009 WL 564940
(U.S. Mar. 6, 2009) (mem.).
24. A reader who already knows the factual and legal background of Hamdi
can jump to Part III, which presents a factual comparison of Hamdi and al-Mani.
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Facts ofHamdi

Yaser Esam Hamdi is a citizen of the United States who was
born in Louisiana in 1980 and raised in Saudi Arabia.2 5 Hamdi
resided in Afghanistan by 2001.26 During that year, members of the
Northern Alliance apprehended Hamdi, Kalashnikov rifle in
hand."
Hamdi was then turned over to the U.S. military and
eventually transferred to Guantanamo Bay.
In April 2002, after
three months of detainment in Guantanamo Bay, authorities
discovered Hamdi's American citizenship. 9 Consequently, U.S.
authorities transferred him to a naval brig in Norfolk, Virginia and
then to a naval brig in Charleston, South Carolina.30
B.

ProceduralHistory ofHamdi

In June 2002, Hamdi's father filed a habeas corpus petition on
Hamdi's behalf. In response, the Government filed a motion to
dismiss the petition,32 attaching a declaration by Michael Mobbs
(Mobbs Declaration), a Department of Defense official "familiar
with the facts and circumstances related to the capture of...
Hamdi," based on his review of "relevant records." 33
This
Declaration asserted that Hamdi was affiliated with a Taliban
military unit and received weapons training, and that such facts
supported his classification as an enemy combatant.3 4
After considering the sufficiency of the Mobbs Declaration, the
district court concluded that it fell "far short" of supporting
Hamdi's detention.
Further, the district court ordered the
25.
26.

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004) (plurality opinion).
Id.

27.

Joel Brinkley, From Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia, via Guantanamo, N.Y.

TIMES, Oct. 16, 2004, at A4; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510.

28.

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510.

29.

Id.

30.

Id.

31.

Id. at 511. Hamdi's father alleged that his son went to Afghanistan to do

.relief work" and requested that he be released from his "unlawful custody." Id.
32. Respondents' Response to, and Motion to Dismiss, the Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va. 2002) (No.
2:02-CV-439).
33. Declaration of Michael H. Mobbs, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d
527
(E.D.
Va.
2002)
(No.
2:02-CV-439),
available
at

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sleeper/tools/mobbshamdi.ht
ml. The Mobbs Declaration was the only evidence the Government provided to
the court in support of Hamdi's detention. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 512.

34.

Declaration of Michael H. Mobbs, supra note 33.

35.

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 533 (2002).
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Government to turn over numerous materials so that the court
could perform a "meaningful judicial review" of Hamdi's
detention.36 Upon the Government's appeal, however, the Fourth
Circuit reversed the lower court's production order and dismissed
the habeas corpus petition.
Granting certiorari, the Supreme Court ultimately reversed the
decision of the Fourth Circuit and remanded the case to the
district court.38 The Supreme Court first analyzed the threshold
issue of whether the President has the authority to detain citizens
who qualify as enemy combatants.39
C. The Supreme Court's Decision in Hamdi
In addressing the first issue, the Hamdi plurality noted that the
40
proper scope of the term enemy combatant is much disputed.
The plurality explained that "[t]he permissible bounds of the
category will be defined by the lower courts as subsequent cases are
presented to them." 4' Rather than determine the exact scope of
the enemy-combatant category, Justice O'Connor, writing for the
42
plurality, confined the holding to certain "narrow circumstances.,
According to the Government, Hamdi was detained because
he carried a weapon against American troops in a foreign
country-that is, that he was an enemy engaged in combat, an
"enemy combatant" in its simplest form.43 In light of this alleged
36. Id. at 532, 536.
37. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 459 (2003).
38. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004).
39. Id. In the months following 9/11, President Bush regularly designated
individuals as enemy combatants for purposes of ordering their military detention.
See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 474 (D.D.C. 2005),
vacated by Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). For instance, all of the
individuals detained at Guantanamo Bay are categorized under the Bush
administration's definition of enemy combatant.
Id. Notwithstanding the
prevalent use of the term "enemy combatant," the Government did not formally
define the term until a July 7, 2004, order creating the Combatant Status Review
Tribunals. Id. Yet, when Hamdi was decided, the "Government [had not]
provided any court with the full criteria that it use[d] in classifying individuals as
such." Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516.
40. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516.
41. Id.at522n.1.
42. Id. at 509 ("We hold that . . . Congress authorized the detention of
combatants in the narrow circumstances alleged in [this case]."); see also Padilla v.
Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 393 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that capture on a foreign
battlefield is not one of the "narrow circumstances" to which the plurality in
Hamdi confined its opinion).
43. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 522 n.1.
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basis, the Hamdi plurality stated that it would determine whether
the detention of citizens who were part of or supporting forces
and who engaged in an
hostile to the United States in Afghanistan permissible.
is
States
United
the
against
armed conflict
The plurality first discussed whether the President has the
statutory authority to detain an individual such as Hamdi. 45 The
Government contended that the Authorization for Use of Military
46
Force (AUMF), passed in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
supplies such authority. The AUMF provides in pertinent part:
[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary
and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks
that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored
such organizations or persons, in order to prevent
any future acts of international terrorism against the
United 48States by such nations, organizations or
persons.
The plurality concluded that the AUMF is "explicit
congressional authorization for the detention of individuals in the
narrow category we describe., 49 The "narrow category" to which
Justice O'Connor referred is the category of "individuals who
fought against the United States in Afghanistan as part of the
the al Qaeda
Taliban, an organization known to have supported
50
terrorist network responsible for those attacks.,
While the Court recognized that the AUMF does not use
specific language of detention, five justices glossed over this fact.
According to these five justices, the absence of language regarding
detention was of no consequence because the detention of Hamdi
44. Id. at 516.
45. The Court addressed this issue in light of 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (a). See Hamdi,
542 U.S. at 517. The statute provides that "[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or
otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress."
18 U.S.C. § 4001 (a) (2004).
46. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541
(Supp. V 2005)). Soon after the enactment of the AUMF, President Bush ordered
U.S. Armed Forces to Afghanistan, with the goal of holding back al Qaeda and
suppressing the Taliban government. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510.
47. Brief for Respondents at 20-21, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696).
48. Authorization for the Use of Military Force, § 2(a).
49.

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517.

50.

Id. at518.
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and any individual who falls in the "limited category" discussed
above, is "so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be
an exercise of the 'necessary and appropriate force' Congress has
authorized the President to use.,5 To be sure, the particular tye
of detention "so fundamental and accepted an incident to war"' 53is
the "detention to prevent a combatant's return to the battlefield.,
Next, the plurality addressed the issue of whether Hamdi's
citizenship precluded his militar detention. In doing so, the
plurality looked to Ex parte Quiin as "the most apposite precedent
that we have on the question of whether citizens may be detained
in such circumstances., 55 Under Quirin, "[U.S.] citizens who
associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy
government, and with its aid, guidance and direction, enter this
country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents. " 56 The
plurality found no reason to draw a line between citizens and
noncitizens for purposes of military detention.57
For these reasons, the Court concluded "that the AUMF is
explicit congressional authorization for the detention of individuals
in the narrow category we describe.""

51. Id. (quoting Authorization for Use of Military Force, § 2(a)).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 519. In support of its choice to overlook the AUMF's lack of specific
language of detention, the Court noted that the "purpose of detention is to
prevent captured individuals from returning to the field of battle and taking up
arms once again." Id. at 518 (citing Naqvi, Doubtful Prisoner-of-WarStatus, 84 INT'L
REV.RED CROss 571, 572 (2002)).
54. 317 U.S. 1 (1942). Quiin dealt with the military trial of Haupt who was
charged with being an "enemy belligerent." Id. at 38. Haupt, a U.S. citizen,
entered this country with orders from the Nazis to destroy domestic war facilities
but was captured before he could execute those orders. Id. at 21.
55. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 523.
56. Id. at 519 (quoting Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37-38). According to Justice
O'Connor, Quiin does not preclude the detention of an individual solely on the
basis of that individual's citizenship. Id. (citing Quiin, 317 U.S. at 20).
57. See id. The Court explained that a "citizen, no less than an alien, can be
'part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners' and
'engaged in an armed conflict against the United States.'" Id. (quoting Brief for
Respondents at 3, Hamd, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696)). Also, whether a citizen or
an alien, a detainee will nonetheless pose the danger of returning to the
battlefield if released. Id.
58. Id. at 517. In June 2004, the Supreme Court ruled that Hamdi was
entitled to procedural due process. Id. at 538. Interestingly, the Government
responded by simply releasing Hamdi in October 2004. Brinkley, supra note 27.
At present, Hamdi resides in Saudi Arabia. Id.
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III. FACTUAL COMPARISON OF HAMDIAND AL-MAR /
To determine whether the al-Marri decision improperly
ventured beyond the framework set forth by the Supreme Court in
Hamdi, it is necessary to draw a factual comparison between the two
cases.
Al-Marri is a citizen of Qatar and a legal resident of the United
States. 9 Hamdi is a citizen of the United States.60
The circumstances surrounding the arrest of al-Marri differ
significantly from those surrounding the seizure of Hamdi. AlMarri was arrested at his home in Peoria, Illinois. 6 1 FBI agents
arrested al-Marri as a material witness in the investigation of the
Hamdi, in contrast, was seized in
9/11 terrorist attacks. 62
63
At that time,
Afghanistan by members of the Northern Alliance.
he was found with a Kalashnikov assault rifle on a battlefield, where
64
he had allegedly fought alongside the Taliban forces.
Al-Marri was initially charged with several federal criminal
66
65
offenses. In contrast, Hamdi was never criminally charged.
Upon being transferred to military custody, al-Marri was
broughtS 67directly • to the Naval Consolidated Brig in South
Hamdi's path to the contiguous United States involved
Carolina.
a few more stops. After the Northern Alliance turned Hamdi over
to the U.S. military, the United States initially detained and
interrogated Hamdi in Afghanistan and eventually brought him to
Guantanamo Bay. 6' Once it discovered his American citizenship,
the United States transferred Hamdi to a Virginia naval brig. 69
In response to al-Marri's petition for habeas corpus, the
That Declaration
Government cited the Rapp Declaration. °
includes allegations, inter alia, that al-Marri held close ties to al
59. AI-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2008) (Motz, J.,
concurring), vacated sub nom. al-Marri v. Spagone, No. 08-368, 2009 WL 564940
(U.S. Mar. 6, 2009) (mem.).
60. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510.
61. AI-Marri, 534 F.3d at 219.
62. Id. at 254 (Traxler,J., concurring).
63. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510.
64. Id. at513.
65. Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 219 (Motz,J., concurring).
66. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510.
67. Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 219.
68. Hamdi,542 U.S. at 510.
69. Id.
70. Respondent's Answer to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, al-Marri
ex rel. Berman v. Wright, 443 F. Supp. 2d 774 (D.S.C. 2006) (No. 2:04-2257-HFF).
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Qaeda; that he received al Qaeda terrorist training for two years;
that he volunteered for a martyr mission; and that he entered the
United States to serve as a sleeper agent and to disrupt the United
States' financial system through computer hacking.7
The Rapp Declaration does not include allegations that alMarri was affiliated with the armed forces of an enemy of the
United States; does not state that al-Marri was seized on or around,
or escaped from, a battlefield on which United States soldiers
fought; does not proclaim that al-Marri was in Afghanistan at a time
when the United States and the Taliban engaged in armed conflict;
and does not assert that al-Marri "directly participated in any
hostilities against the United States."7
In response to Hamdi's petition forS 73habeas corpus, the
Unlike the Rapp
Government cited to the Mobbs Declaration.
Declaration in al-Marri,the Mobbs Declaration includes allegations
that Hamdi "affiliated with a Taliban military unit and received
weapons training... [and that he] engaged in battle with the
Taliban."74 Further, the Mobbs Declaration states, "because al
Qaeda and the Taliban were and are hostile forces engaged in
armed conflict with the United States, individuals associated75with
[those groups] were, and continue to be, enemy combatants.,
The key differences between these two "enemy combatants"
are summarized in the table below.
Table 1. Fact Comparison: Hamdi vs. al-Marri

Citizenship

Hamdi
United States

Place of
Arrest/Seizure
Circumstances
Surrounding

Desert battlefield in
Afghanistan
Engaged in armed
combat against the

Arrest/Seizure

United States

al-Marri
Qatar,
legal U.S. resident
Residence in Illinois
Material witness in
9/11 investigation

71. See Declaration ofJeffrey N. Rapp, al-Marri ex rel. Berman v. Wright, 443 F.
(No.
2:04-2257-HFF),
available at
Supp. 2d 774
(D.S.C. 2006)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/nation/documents/effreyrapp-docume
nt.pdf.
72.

Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 220.

73.
74.

See supranotes 33-34 and accompanying text.
Declaration of Michael H. Mobbs, supranote 33.

75.

Id.
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Criminal Charges
Before Military
Detention

None filed

Association with
Hostile Forces

Allegedly fought
alongside the

5141

Criminal charges
included credit-card
fraud and lying to
federal agents
None alleged

Taliban

This factual comparison between al-Marri and Hamdi
incorporates the facts relevant to each court's decision.
Admittedly, noteworthy similarities exist between the cases.
However, it is important to understand that the key differences
highlight Hamdi's active combatant status and al-Marri's lack
thereof. It is now appropriate to turn to the Fourth Circuit's
decision of al-Marri to determine whether it deviates from the
framework set forth by the Supreme Court in Hamdi.
IV. AL-MARRI V. PUCCIARELLI

A.

ProceduralHistory of al-Marri

In July 2003, after an initial petition was dismissed for
improper venue,76 al-Marri's legal counsel filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the District of South
Carolina. 77 The district court judge, Henry Franklin Floyd,
ultimately held that the AUMF authorized the President to
the United
militarily detain a legal alien who had legally entered
78
States and was later declared an enemy combatant.
76. In al-Marri v. Bush, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (C.D. Il. 2003), the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of Illinois dismissed al-Marri's petition on the basis
of improper venue. Id. at 1010. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
eventually affirmed this ruling. Al-Marri v. Rumsfeld, 360 F.3d 707, 712 (7th Cir.
2004).
77. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, al-Marri ex rel. Berman v. Wright, 443
F. Supp. 2d 774 (D.S.C. 2006) (No. 2:04-2257-HFF). As it was undisputed that alMarri was unavailable to sign for himself, al-Marri's counsel filed a petition on his
behalf, making five claims: (1) unlawful detention, (2) right to counsel, (3) right
to be charged, (4) denial of due process, and (5) unlawful interrogation. Id.
Moreover, "[e] ight formerJustice Department officials (including ...Janet Reno),
[twenty-nine] legal scholars . ..and three retired military leaders filed friend-ofthe-court briefs on behalf of al-Marri." Sent from Peoria to the Brig, Terror Suspect in
Limbo, USATODA,June 13, 2007, at 1OA [hereinafter Sent from Peoria].
78. Al-Marri ex rel. Berman v. Wright, 443 F. Supp. 2d 774, 785 (D.S.C. 2006),
rev'd al-Marri ex rel. Berman v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 2007), rev'd en
banc sub nom., al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated sub nom.
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Al-Marri eventually appealed to the Fourth Circuit. 79 Two
circuit judges, Judge Motz and Judge Gregory, and a U.S. district
court judge, Judge Hudson, joined as a panel to review two lowercourt decisions. After examining Hamdi and Padillav. Hanft,1s the
panel majority held that an individual's enemy combatant status
rests on his affiliation during wartime with the military arm of an
enemy government.8 2 According to the panel majority, the
Government failed to demonstrate that al-Marri had any wartime
affiliation with the military arm of an enemy government, and
therefore al-Marri fell outside the enemy-combatant category. 81
The panel majority thus concluded that the AUMF does not supply
a basis for al-Marri's seizure and indefinite military detention. s4
B.

The Fourth Circuit'sEn Banc Decision

On rehearing, the Fourth Circuit considered the case en banc
and reversed the panel decision. 8 Among the seven opinions of
al-Marri v. Spagone, No. 08-368, 2009 WL 564940 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2009) (mem.). In
reaching this conclusion, Judge Floyd adopted a magistrate judge's report and
recommendations. Id.
79. AI-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 166 (4th Cir. 2007), rev'd al-Marri v.
Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated sub nom. al-Marri v. Spagone, No.
08-368, 2009 WL 564940 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2009) (mem.).
80. Id. at 163. U.S. District Court Judge Hudson, sitting by designation,
ultimately dissented. Id. Circuit Judge Diana Motz filed an opinion in which
Judge Gregoryjoined. Id.
81. 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005). Jose Padilla, like Hamdi, was an American
citizen who associated with forces hostile to the United States in Afghanistan and
took up arms against U.S. forces in that country. Id. at 388. Unlike Hamdi, Padilla
"was arrested by civilian law enforcement authorities upon his arrival at O'Hare
International Airport in Chicago." Id. In Padilla,the Fourth Circuit held that the
President possesses the authority to militarily detain a U.S. citizen who is closely
associated with al Qaeda; took up arms on behalf of that enemy and against the
United States in a foreign combat zone of that war; and thereafter traveled to the
United States for the "avowed purpose of further prosecuting that war on
American soil, against American citizens and targets." Id. at 389. After Padilla
sought certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, the Government obtained an
indictment charging him with various federal crimes. Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S.
1062, 1062 (2006) (mem.). At that time, President Bush ordered that Padilla be
released from military custody and transferred to the control of the Attorney
General to face criminal charges. Id. In light of the federal charges and
presidential order, the Supreme Court denied Padilla's petition for a writ of
certiorari. Id.
82. AI-Marri, 487 F.3d at 182.
83. Id. at 183.
84. Id.
85. AI-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 216 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated sub nom.
al-Marri v. Spagone, No. 08-368, 2009 WL 564940 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2009) (mem.).
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the en banc decision, Judge Traxler's concurring opinion is
commonly acknowledged as controlling justification for the
decision.
Judge Traxler began with the general principle that the
Government may not detain a person before a trial determination
of guilt. 87 However, if properly designated an enemy combatant
pursuant to the President's legal authority, such persons may be
criminal proceedings "for the duration
detained without charge or
8' 8
"
of the relevant hostilities.

Judge Traxler then addressed Hamdi.89 He recognized that the
Hamdi Court discussed the authority to detain individuals falling
into a particular "limited category" that included "individuals who
[took up arms and] fought against the United States in Afghanistan
as part of the Taliban, an organization known to have supported
the al Qaeda terrorist network responsible for [the 9/11] attacks." 90
Judge Traxler emphasized that the Hamdi Court was not
required to decide the exact issue present in al-Marri---namely,
whether an individual's mere alleged affiliation with al Qaeda, and
not an association with the military arm of an enemy government,
would support the individual's detention as an enemy combatant. 9'
As a result, Traxler agreed with his colleagues that Hamdi does not
compel the conclusion that the President is congressionally
92
authorized to detain al-Marri as an enemy combatant.
Nonetheless, Judge Traxler concluded that the AUMF
authorizes the President to detain as an enemy combatant any
individual who associates with al Qaeda "even though the
government cannot establish that the combatant also took up arms
on behalf of that enemy and against our country in a foreign
86. As to the authority to detain and the due process issues, Chief Judge
Williams and Judges Wilkinson, Duncan, and Niemeyer sided with the
Government. Id. at 216-17. Further, as to both issues, Judges Michael, Motz,
Gregory, and King sided with al-Marri. Id. As such, Judge Traxler's vote was
necessary to form a majority on each issue. Id. In additionJudge Traxler did not
join any opinion written by otherjudges. Seegenerally id.
87. Id. at 257 (Traxler,J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739, 755 (1987)).
88. Id. (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519-21 (2004)). Other
exceptions to the general principle include: the civil commitment of mentally ill
sex offenders, the pretrial detention of dangerous adults and dangerous juveniles,
and the civil commitment of mentally ill. Id. at 223 (Motz,J., concurring).
89. Id. at 257 (Traxler,J., concurring).
90. Id. (quoting Hamdi v.Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004)).
91. Id. at 259.
92. Id.
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combat zone of that war." 93 In reaching this conclusion, Judge
Traxler stressed two main points.
First, according to Judge Traxler, Congress passed the AUMF
to target individuals who are dispatched to the United States by al
Qaeda to act "as sleeper agents and terrorist operatives charged
with the 94task of committing additional attacks upon our
homeland."
Secondly, relying on Quirin,Judge Traxler stated that it does
not matter that al-Marri neither committed nor attempted to
commit any act of depredation, nor entered a battlefield zone,
because an individual is an enemy belligerent subject to detention
as soon as he enters the United States "with hostile purpose. ",95
According toJudge Traxler, al-Marri entered the United States with
hostile intentions because he is an alleged al Qaeda operative who
associated with the enemy "and with its aid, guidance and
direction, entered this country bent on hostile acts." 96
In sum, because "the AUMF plainly authorizes the President to
use all necessary and appropriate force against al Qaeda," Judge
Traxler maintained that this authority necessarily includes the
detention of individuals like al-Marri. 9 7 Therefore, Judge Traxler
concluded that the President possesses authority to detain al-Marri
as an enemy combatant.
V.

ANALYSIS OF AL-MARR/DECISION

A.
The Fourth Circuit Improperly Expanded the President'sAuthority
to Detain
In light of precedent set forth in Hamdi, the Fourth Circuit in
al-Marrierred in two respects. First, al-Marri does not fit within the
93. Id. at 258 (quoting Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 389 (4th Cir. 2005))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
94. Id. at 259. Judge Traxler also noted that "it was the 9/11 attacks which
triggered the passage of the AUMF." Id. at 260. Furthermore, he stated that there
is nothing in the AUMF's language that suggests that Congress intended to limit
the President's authority to detain enemy combatants to acts occurring in foreign
territories. Id. Judge Traxler found it difficult to believe that "Congress, in
enacting the AUMF in the wake of those attacks, did not intend for it to encompass
al Qaeda operatives standing in the exact position as the attackers who brought
about its enactment." Id.
95. Id. at 261 (quoting ExparteQuirin,317 U.S. 1, 38 (1942)).
96. Id. (quoting Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37-38) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
97. Id.
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"limited category" discussed in Hamdi that was so essential to its
holding. Second, al-Marri's detention is not a fundamental and
of the
accepted incident to war to be considered an exercise
9
"necessary and appropriate force" stated in the AUMF. 8
1. Al-Marri Does Not Fit Within the "Limited Category" Set Forth in
Hamdi.
The Fourth Circuit first erred by discounting the
consequences of the fact that al-Marri does not fit within the
"limited category" set forth in Hamdi. The Hamdi plurality held
that the AUMF is "explicit congressional authorization for the
detention of individuals in the [limited] category we describe. ' 99
Once again, the "limited category" consists of individuals who are:
(1) "part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or
coalition partners in Afghanistan," and (2) "engaged in an armed
conflict against the United States."'00
In light of the factual comparison above, al-Marri does not fit
within this "limited category." When arrested, Hamdi was bearing
arms on behalf of the enemy in a foreign102combat zone,01 but alRather, al-Marri was
Marri's arrest involved no such conduct.
as part of a 9/11
the
FBI
arrested in the United States by
3
investigation. 1 As one Fourth Circuit judge put it, to compare
Hamdi's capture with al-Marri's arrest is "to compare apples and
oranges. '' 10 4 Plainly, al-Marri: (1) was not an individual who was
"part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or
98. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).
99. Id. at 517.
100. Id. at 516 (internal quotation marks omitted).
101. Id. at 510.
102. Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 254-55. Another salient factual difference between
Hamdi and al-Man-i is Hamdi's alleged affiliation with the Taliban government and
al-Marri's lack thereof. Id. at 220 (Motz, J., concurring); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 51213. The Government alleged that al-Marri was merely affiliated with al Qaeda. AlMan-i, 534 F.3d at 220. As to this difference, the Fourth Circuit correctly ruled
that al-Marri's alleged affiliation with al Qaeda was insufficient to support the
enemy combatant status. Id. at 259-60. The particular choice of language in the
AUMF-specifically targeting terrorist "organizations or persons" connected to
9/11 rather than exclusively foreign governments-reflected a legislative choice
not to distinguish between al Qaeda and Taliban forces. Shill, supra note 3, at 405;
see also Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 392 (4th Cir. 2005) ("[M]ilitary detention as
an enemy combatant by the President is unquestionably authorized by the AUMF
as a fundamental incident to the President's prosecution of the war against al
Qaeda in Afghanistan.") (emphasis added).
103. Al-Mani, 534 F.3d at 254 (Motz,J., concurring).
104. ld. at 232 n.15.
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coalition partners in Afghanistan,"'' 0 5 and (2) was not an individual
"who engaged in an armed conflict against the United States
there. ,,106 Therefore, al-Marri does not fit within the "limited
category" discussed in Hamdi.
After reaching the conclusion that al-Marri falls outside of the
"limited category," the next issue is whether such a distinction is
relevant. Unlike several other distinctions, such as citizenship, m7
enemy affiliation,' and "locus of capture, ' 09 there is a clear basis
in Hamdi's reasoning for the "limited category" distinction. In fact,
the Fourth Circuit admitted in Padilla that the qualities of being
"part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States" and of
"engag[ing] in an armed conflict against the United States" were
two of the "narrow circumstances" to which the Hamdi plurality
confined its opinion.'"° Accordingly, the fact that al-Marri does not
fit within the "limited category" is relevant to the al-Marri case in
light of the Hamdi Court's reasoning.
Contrary to Judge Wilkinson's dissenting argument,"' the
Hamdi Court's "limited category" distinction reflects the Court's
unwillingness to extend the enemy-combatant category to
individuals other than those engaged in armed conflict on a
battlefield. Nothing in Hamdi suggests that the AUMF permits
indefinite military detention beyond the "limited category" of
105. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516.
106. Id.
107. After examining precedent in Quirin, the Hamdi plurality stated that
nothing suggests a detainee's citizenship should preclude his detention for the
duration of the relevant hostilities. Id. at 519 (quoting Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20). For
an in-depth analysis of the significance of citizenship in enemy combatant cases,
see Jerome A. Barron, Citizenship Matters: The Enemy Combatant Cases, 19 NOTRE
DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 33 (2005).
108. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
109. In Padilla, the Fourth Circuit addressed and rejected the "locus of
capture" distinction. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 393 (4th Cir. 2005). The
court asked whether the Hamdi Court's reasoning admitted "a distinction between
an enemy combatant captured abroad and detained in the United States, such as
Hamdi, and an enemy combatant who escaped capture abroad but was ultimately
captured domestically and detained in the United States, such as Padilla." Id. The
Fourth Circuit ultimately concluded that the "locus of capture" distinction is not
relevant because "capture on a foreign battlefield" was not one of the "narrow
circumstances" to which the plurality in Hamdi confined its opinion. Id.
110. See id. (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516).
111. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 314 (4th Cir. 2008) (Wilkinson, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("The plurality has consistently overread
Hamdi, to the effect that only those engaged in armed conflict on a foreign
battlefield fall into the enemy-combatant category."), vacated sub nom. al-Marri v.
Spagone, No. 08-368, 2009 WL 564940 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2009) (mem.).
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people covered by the "narrow circumstances" of that case.112
In sum, the "limited category" designation reflects the narrow
circumstances to which the Hamdi plurality deliberately confined its
opinion. The Hamdi plurality cautiously limited its opinion, but
not in a manner that leaves room for an argument that the
President is authorized to declare a normal citizen, who has not
"engaged in an armed conflict against the United States," as an
enemy combatant. 13 Plainly, the Fourth Circuit erred in holding
that the President is authorized to detain al-Marri because al-Marri
does not fit within the "limited category" set forth in Hamdi.
2. AI-Marri's Detention Is Not a FundamentalIncident to War and
Not an Exercise of the "Necessary and Appropriate Force" Under the
AUMF.
Even assuming arguendo that the above "limited category"
argument is a product of overreading Hamdi and that the "limited
category" distinction is irrelevant, al-Marri's military detention is
improper as it is not pursuant to an act of Congress.1

14

More

specifically, the AUMF is not explicit congressional authorization
for the detention of individuals like al-Marri, because such
11
detention is not an exercise of "necessary and appropriate force." '
To reach this conclusion, it is again critical to examine the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Hamdi. When addressing whether
Hamdi's detention was an exercise of such "necessary and
appropriate force," the Hamdi Court identified the purpose for
which Hamdi was detained-namely, "to prevent a combatant's
return to the battlefield.""1 6 According to the Court, "[b]ecause
detention to prevent a combatant's return to the battlefield is a
fundamental incident of waging war, in permitting the use of
'necessary and appropriate force,' Congress has clearly and
unmistakably authorized detention in the narrow circumstances
considered here. 1 .
Accordingly, the Supreme Court in Hamdi
found that the AUMF authorizes the President to engage in the

112. See id. at 232-33 (Motz,J., concurring).
113. Hamdiv. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517 (2004).
114. See 18 U.S.C. §4001(a) (2004) ("No citizen shall be imprisoned or
other-wise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.").
115. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519; see Authorization for the Use of Military Force, §
2(a), 115 Stat. 224.
116. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519.
117. Id. (emphasis added).
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"fundamental incident[s] of waging war."118
Indeed, it follows that Congress has authorized al-Marri's
detention if the purpose thereof is a "fundamental incident of
waging war." Accordingly, two steps must be taken: (1) identifying
the purpose of al-Marri's detention, and (2) determining whether
such purpose is a "fundamental incident of waging war."
First, it is clear that the purpose of Hamdi's detentionpreventing a combatant's return to the battlefield-does not apply
to al-Marri. " 9 Rather, the most likely purpose of al-Marri's
detention can be identified by examining the language of President
Bush's initial order declaring al-Marri an "enemy combatant" as
well as the language of the Rapp Declaration. In his Order,
was
President Bush alleged that al-Marri's military
•
,120 detention
-.
"necessary to prevent him from aiding al Qaeda.'
According to
the Rapp Declaration, al-Marri would have aided al Qaeda by
serving as a "sleeper agent" to facilitate terrorist activities and by
disrupting this country's financial system through computer
Considering the allegations in the President's Order
hacking.'
and the Rapp Declaration, the purpose of al-Marri's detention was
to prevent him from aiding al Qaeda by serving as a "sleeper agent"
to facilitate terrorist activities and by disrupting the U.S. financial
system.
Second, to determine whether such purpose is a "fundamental
incident of waging war," one must examine the nature of the
present war and al-Marri's role therein. The present war may be
unconventional."' Nonetheless, it is a war between the United
States and al Qaeda. 113 Further, al-Marri may be a serious criminal
118. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 313 (4th Cir. 2008) (Wilkinson, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519), vacated
sub nom. al-Marri v. Spagone, No. 08-368, 2009 WL 564940 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2009)
(mem.).
119. The Government did not allege that al-Marri was seized on, near, or
escaped from a battlefield on which the armed forces of the United States or its
allies were engaged in combat. See id. at 220 (MotzJ., concurring), Therefore, no
one could reasonably argue that the purpose of al-Marri's detention was "to
prevent [his] return to the battlefield." See Hamdi,542 U.S. at 519.
120. Official Designation of President George W. Bush, supra note 9.
121. Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 220.
122. Id. at 260 (Traxler, J., concurring) (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d
278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002)).
123. Id. at 260-61 (citing Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 389 (4th Cir. 2005)).
In addition, Judge Traxler stated that members of al Qaeda "fight us with
conventional weapons in Afghanistan and Iraq, but they have also infiltrated our
borders and those of our allies, bent on committing, at a minimum, sabotage and
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and a member of a terrorist organization.
Yet, al-Marri is
appreciably different from
a
soldier
at
war
in
one enormous
2
1
respect: he is a civilian.
The Fourth Circuit's decision effectively undermines the
United States' "deeply rooted and ancient opposition ... to the
extension of military control over civians. 2
It is one thing to
argue that the civilian
criminal
justice
system
can
effectively handle
126
terrorism cases.
It is quite another to argue that the military
detention model can properly handle civilian cases. 127 Tellingly,
the latter argument is rarely asserted and the civilian-combatant
distinction ought to be upheld. Accordingly, detention to prevent
a civilian from facilitating terrorist activities and disrupting our
financial system is not a "fundamental incidence of waging war."
In sum, although the military detention of enemy combatants
like Hamdi is certainly "a fundamental incident of waging war" as
understood in the AUMF, the military detention of civilians like alMarri certainly is not. 12 Accordingly, in the absence of explicit
congressional authorization for the detention of individuals like alMarri, the Fourth
Circuit impermissibly expanded precedent set
29
forth in Hamdi.1

other war-like acts targeting both military and civilian installations and citizens."
Id. at 261.
124. See id. at 247 (Motz, J., concurring) ("[A]l-Marri is still a civilian: he does
not fit within the 'permissible bounds of '[t]he legal category of enemy
combatant."') (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 522 n.1 (2004)).
125. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 33 (1957); see Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15
(1972) (recognizing a traditional American resistance to any military intrusion
into civilian affairs).
126. See Ten Questions on NationalSecurity, supra note 2, at 5062-73.
127. It is this author's opinion that to hold that the military detention of a
civilian is a "fundamental incident of waging war" is tantamount to robbing the
traditional civilian criminal justice system of its ability to effectively prosecute
civilians like al-Marri.
128. Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 238-39 (Motz, J., concurring) (quoting Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004)) (internal citation omitted). In addition, it is
important to recall that the Hamdi plurality announced Ex parte Quirin as "the most
apposite precedent that we have on the question of whether citizens may be
detained in such circumstances." Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 523. However, "[n]either
Quirin nor any other precedent

even

suggests . .

.

that individuals with

constitutional rights, unaffiliated with the military arm of any enemy government,
can be subjected to military jurisdiction and deprived of those rights solely on the
basis of their conduct on behalf of a terrorist organization." Al-Mani, 534 F.3d at
235 (MotzJ., concurring).
129. For an argument reaching a contrary conclusion with respect to the
Fourth Circuit's panel decision, see Shill, supra note 3, at 405.
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Raising and DismissingPotential Counterarguments

Those who disagree with the above analyses are likely to
present two main counterarguments. First, one could argue that a
broad construction of the AUMF authorizes the President to
militarily detain a person like al-Marri. Second, one could argue
that the Hamdi court expressly permitted the district court and
Fourth Circuit in al-Marri to adopt an expansive definition of the
"enemy combatant" category. This note will address and dismiss
each counterargument.
1. A Broad Construction of the A UMF Authorizes the President to
Indefinitely Detain al-Marri.
One could argue, as Judge Traxler did, that the AUMF can be
read broadly as "plainly authoriz[ing] the President to use all
necessary and appropriate force against al Qaeda." 3 " According to
Judge Traxler, this construction of the AUMF "necessarily includes
the detention of al Qaeda operatives who associate with... al
Qaeda... and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this
country bent on hostile acts."13'
This counterargument fails for two reasons. First, by giving full
force to the AUMF's plain language and by underreading the
Hamdi Court's construction of the AUMF, Judge Traxler's broad
construction will produce "absurd results.""' It is a well-founded
and common concern that, taken to its extreme, the AUMF's
reference to organizations or persons who "aided in" the 9/11
attacks could endanger U.S. citizens. 33 Furthermore, because the
initial designation of an enemy combatant is based merely on the
President's say-so, such a rule is susceptible to grave abuse.
Accordingly, a rule permitting the indefinite military detention of
citizens who bear no resemblance to fighters on a battlefield treads
130. AI-Marri, 534 F.3d at 261 (TraxlerJ., concurring).
131.
Id. (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1942)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
132. Id. at 226 n.9 (MotzJ., concurring).
133. See id. at 286 n.4 (Williams, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("I
understand al-Marri's concern that, taken to its extreme, the AUMF's reference to
organizations or persons who 'aided in' the September 11 attacks might produce
absurd results.").
In addition to endangering citizens, the Fourth Circuit's
decision could also endanger U.S. military troops. Many commentators, including
former Department ofJustice officials, legal scholars, and retired military leaders
argue that giving al-Marri legal rights helps protect U.S. troops from arbitrary
imprisonment while abroad. See Sent from Peoria, supranote 77.
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too closely to the detention of ordinary Americans and therefore
should not be used.
Second, this counterargument overlooks the well-recognized
canon of constitutional avoidance. A statute such as the AUMF
should be construed to avoid "serious constitutional problems."134
Judge Traxler's broad construction of the AUMF fails to avoid
"serious constitutional problems," such as violation of the Due
Process Clause. 135 The Due Process Clause protects both American
citizens and lawfully admitted aliens, 136 who, like al-Marri,
have
13
established substantial connections in the United States. 7
Overall, the Fourth Circuit erred by employing an overly broad
construction of the AUMF, one which raises serious constitutional
3
problems and will produce absurd results in the future.

134. Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 313 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part); see also Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380-81 (2005); Jones v. United

States, 526 U.S. 227, 239 (1999).
135. The Due Process Clause of the Constitution guarantees that no "person"
shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
136. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2246 (2008) (noting that the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect both citizens and foreign nationals);
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 212 (1982) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment
applies "to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction") (emphasis omitted).
While the Fourth Circuit's decision may be more easily digested because al-Marri is
a legal U.S. resident and not a U.S. citizen, the Court's reasoning makes no such
distinction and therefore appears to be equally applicable to U.S. citizens. See
Editorial, DetainingMr. Marri,N.Y. TIMES,July 20, 2008, at WK10.
137. Al-Mari, 534 F.3d at 222 (Motz, J., concurring). The Fourth Circuit
noted that the Due Process Clause affords this guarantee to "persons," not merely
citizens. Id. (citing Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896)); see
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990). Moreover, al-Marri
established substantial connections in the United States by residing in Illinois for
several months with his family and attending the university there. Id.
138. The Government's arguments in al-Marri are also noteworthy; they reflect
the obvious difficulties with interpreting the AUMF to give effect to its broad
language. The Government wisely limited its argument in support of al-Marri's
designation as an enemy combatant by not requiring the Fourth Circuit to "deal
with the absurd results, [or] reach the constitutional concerns, raised by an
interpretation of the AUMF that would authorize the President to detain
indefinitely-without criminal charge or process-anyone he believes to have aided
any 'nation[], organization[], or person[]' related to the September l1th
terrorists." Al-Marr, 534 F.3d at 226 (Motz, J., concurring) (citing Authorization
for the Use of Military Force, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224).
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2. The Hamdi Court Permitted the District Court and Fourth
Circuit in al-Marri to Adopt an Expansive Definition of the "Enemy
Combatant" Category.
Notwithstanding the conclusion that a broad construction of
the AUMF cannot justify the Fourth Circuit's decision without
serious constitutional problems, could an expansive definition of
the
"enemy combatant"
category
suffice?
The
next
counterargument involves the assertion that the district court and
Fourth Circuit in al-Marriwere simply accepting the Hamdi Court's
invitation when it stated "[t] he permissible bounds of the category
will be defined by the lower courts as subsequent cases are

presented to them." 139
While, at first blush, this argument appears to have merit, the
Hamdi Court's invitation is not without limits. Specifically, the law
of war 14 remains of "primary importance" in determining the
permissible bounds of the enemy-combatant category.' 4 ' In fact,
American courts have consistently looked to the law-of-war
principles when determining which individuals fit within the

enemy-combatant category.
It follows, naturally, that lower
courts are not free to go beyond such law-of-war principles when
defining the "permissible bounds of the [enemy combatant]

139. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 522 n.1 (2004). Judge Wilkinson raised
this exact argument in his opinion. Al-Ma-i, 534 F.3d at 314 (Wilkinson, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). He stated that, because the al-Marri case
raises fundamental questions about the President's power to militarily detain
suspected terrorists lawfully residing in this country, there is an "obligation to
examine the precise contours of the enemy-combatant category and to develop a
framework for determining who under our Constitution may be lawfully
detained." Id.
140. In general, the law of war "encompasses all international law for the
conduct of hostilities binding on the United States or its individual citizens,
including treaties and international agreements to which the United States is a
party, and applicable customary international law." U.S. Dep't of Def., Directive
2311.01E, D.O.D. Law of War Program,
3.1 (May 9, 2006), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d231 _01 e.pdf.
141. Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 314 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
142. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) ("[W]e understand
Congress' grant of authority for the use of 'necessary and appropriate force' to
include the authority to detain for the duration of the relevant conflict, and our
understanding is based on longstanding law-of-war principles."); Ex parte Quirin,
317 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1942) ("From the very beginning of its history this Court has
recognized and applied the law of war."); Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 391 (4th
Cir. 2005).
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category," as the Hamdi Court invited.141

The lower courts in al-Marri--both the district court and the
en banc Fourth Circuit-yielded to the Government's wishes and
adopted an unprecedented definition of the enemy-combatant
category.144 In the controlling opinion, Judge Traxler stated that,
"in [his] view, limiting the President's authority to militarily detain
soldiers or saboteurs as enemy combatants to those who are part of
a formal military arm of a foreign nation or enemy government is
not compelled by the laws of war." 4 5 However, Judge Traxler's
analysis began and ended with that conclusory statement-he
provided no authority or explanation for the assertion.
Unlike Judge Traxler, other Fourth Circuit judges addressed
the pertinent law-of-war principles. 4 6
One salient law-of-war
143. Al-Man-i, 534 F.3d at 242 (Motz,J., concurring). In addition to exceeding
traditional law-of-war principles, the lower courts' definition of "enemy
combatant" contradicts the definition of the term "combatant" found in U.S.
military handbooks. For example, as noted in the text, "[a]nyone engaging in
hostilities in an armed conflict on behalf of a party to the conflict is a
'combatant."' JORDAN J. PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S
UNLAWFUL RESPONSES IN THE "WAR" ON TERROR 52 (2007) (quoting U.S. ARMYJUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 12 (2002)). Further,
"combatants ... include all members of the regularly organized armed forced of a
party to the conflict." Id. (quoting THE U.S. NAVY, ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 296 § 5-3 (Naval War College, Int'l
L. Studies vol. 73, 1999)).
144. The Fourth Circuit's definition of an "enemy combatant" is alarmingly
similar to the definition used in Paul Wolfowit7's July 7, 2004, order creating the
Combatant Status Review Tribunal, a military tribunal to review the status of each
detainee at Guantanamo Bay. Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec'y of Def., Memorandum
for the Secretary of the Navy: Order Establishing Combatant Status Review
Tribunal
(July
7,
2004),
available
at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf.
The Order
defines "enemy combatant" as an "individual who was part of or supporting
Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities
against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who
has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of
enemy armed forces." Id. The definition of "enemy combatant" contained in the
July 7, 2004, Order, however, is "significantly broader than the definition
considered in Hamdi." In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 475
(D.D.C. 2005), vacated by Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008).
145. AI-Marri7, 534 F.3d at 261 (Traxler, J., concurring).
146. Id. at 242 (Motz, J., concurring) ("But nothing in any of the Hamdi
opinions suggests that lower courts, absent express congressional authorization,
are free to venture beyond traditional law-of-war principles to fashion these
"permissible bounds."); Id. at 286 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part) ("[Judge Motz's] opinion may very well be correct that, under the
traditional 'law of war,' persons not affiliated with the military of a nation-state
may not be considered enemy combatants.").
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principle involves the key distinction between a "civilian" and a
"combatant," when properly understood as terms of art under
the
Geneva Conventions. 47 The term "civilian" denotes someone in a
certain legal category who is not subject to military detention,
whereas the term "combatant" denotes a member of a different
legal category who is subject to military seizure and detention. 14s
Therefore, by adopting a definition of the enemy combatant
category that includes civilians who bear absolutely no resemblance
to fighters on a battlefield, the civilian-combatant distinction
collapses into itself. By adopting such a definition, the lower courts
ventured beyond this long-standing law-of-war principle. 149 In
conclusion, to expand the enemy-combatant category to include
individuals who bear no resemblance to armed fighters on a
battlefield is unprecedented and undoubtedly against the law of
war.
C.

The Future of al-Marri

While the dispositive issue ultimately resounded in
insufficiency of process, the fractured en banc decision with respect
to the authority to detain issue is in dire need of correction.
Plainly, the Fourth Circuit's convoluted set of opinions is too
confusing to give proper guidance to other courts, the executive
branch, or the people.
Initially, on September 19, 2008, al-Marri filed a petition for a
writ of certiorari.1 Al-Marri's petition raised this single question:
147. Id. at 227 n.ll (MotzJ., concurring) (citing Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 2, 4, 5, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287).
148.

Id.

149. See PAUST, supra note 143, at 56 ("[T]he Bush administration's
classification of members of al Qaeda as 'enemy combatants' deflates the meaning
of combatant.").
150. DetainingMr. Marri,supra note 136.
151. Given the two separate majorities of the Fourth Circuit's decision, either
party was in a position to seek Supreme Court review. Shortly after the Fourth
Circuit's en banc decision, however, the Government released a statement
indicating that it would not seek the Supreme Court's review of the due process

holding. Press Release, Brian Roehrkasse, Dir. of Pub. Affairs, Dep't of Justice,
Today's Decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in al-Marri v.

Pucciarelli
(July
15,
2008),
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wpconten t/uploads/2008/07/doj-statementjuly-1 5.doc.
In that statement, the
Director of Public Affairs stated, "We are pleased with the court's en banc decision

today. The decision recognizes the President's authority to capture and detain al
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Does the Authorization for Use of Military Force...
authorize-and if so does the Constitution allowthe seizure and indefinite military detention of a
person lawfully residing in the United States,
without criminal charge or trial, based on
government assertions that the detainee conspired
with al Qaeda to engage in terrorist activities?
On December 5, 2008, the Supreme Court granted al-Marri's
153
Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
However, as anticipated by some commentators, 54 al-Marridid
not run its course. On January 22, 2009, at the dawn of his
presidency, President Barack Obama issued a memorandum that
mandated a review of al-Marri's detention.155 Over a month later,
President Obama issued a second memorandum directing the
Secretary of Defense to transfer al-Marri to the control of Attorney
General Eric Holder upon the Attorney General's request."' On
March 6, 2009, the Supreme Court granted the request by vacating
the Fourth Circuit's ruling and effectively withdrawing the
controversial victory of the Bush administration. 5 7
Presently, al-Marri is back in the criminal justice system facing
terrorism charges, and according to the Supreme Court, al-Marri's
case is now moot.
The one-paragraph Supreme Court ruling
Qaeda agents who, like the 9-11 hijackers, come to this country to commit or
facilitate war-like acts against American civilians." Id.
152. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, No. 08-368 (U.S.
Sept. 19, 2008).
153. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 129 S. Ct. 680 (2008) (mem.).
154. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Early Test of Obama View on Power Over Detainees,N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 2, 2009, at Al; Susan Page, For Obama, Tough Decisions from the Start,
U.S.A. TODAY, Jan. 20, 2009, at Al.
155. Memorandum for the Attorney General on Review of Detention of Ali
Saleh
Kahlah
al-Marri
(Jan.
22,
2009),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/Review of_theDetention-of Ali S
alehKahlah.
156. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense on Transfer of Detainee to

Control
of
the
Attorney
General
(Feb.
27,
2009),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/Transfer-of-Detainee-to-Control-ofthe-Attorney-General/.
157. AI-Marri v. Spagone, No. 08-368, 2009 WL 564940, at *1 (U.S. Mar. 6,
2009) (mem.). Some civil rights groups have expressed satisfaction with the
Supreme Court's decision. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices Erase Court Ruling That
Allowed a Detention, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2009, at A9.
158. Al-Marri, 2009 WL 564940, at *1 (citing United States v. Munsingwear,
Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950)). If the Supreme Court had heard al-Marri,the al-Marri
case would have taken the Supreme Court Justices well beyond the four
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does not discuss the possibility that al-Marri will be redesignated
and redetained as an enemy combatant. 159 However, such a
possibility still exists even though the Obama administration
announced that it will no longer use the term "enemy combatant"
for certain detainees."'6 President Obama's administration claims
roughly the same authority asserted by the Bush administration to
indefinitely detain detainees, and offered "essentially 61
the same
definition of 'enemy combatant' without using the term." 1
While al-Marri did not result in a Supreme Court opinion, the
Fourth Circuit's analysis is still relevant. Al-Mari is one of only
three cases discussing the treatment of U.S. citizens as enemy
combatants."' In addition, al-Marri continues to be important as
the most recent example of a court attempting to discern the scope
of the enemy-combatant category. In any event, the fractured
Fourth Circuit decision in al-Man-i will assist the Nation's highest
Court in clarifying the issue of the President's authority to detain
enemy combatants.
VI. CONCLUSION

As Judge Traxler noted, the al-Mani case is fraught with
danger. The potential for the executive to abuse its power in the
wake of this decision is overwhelming. Therefore, the controversial
issues in the case must be considered with unusual care. By
holding that the AUMF authorizes the President to detain al-Marri
as an enemy combatant, the Fourth Circuit erred by overstepping
the framework set forth by the Supreme Court in Hamdi. Holding
that the President may detain individuals who did not take up arms
on behalf of an enemy of the United States, the enemy-combatant
category would be to expand it to unprecedented size. If the
major rulings arising out of the "war on terrorism," confronting issues of domestic
power of the U.S. military and of the President as Commander in Chief. Posting
of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSBIog, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/presidentsdomestic-detention-power-tested/ (Sept. 19, 2008, 13:30 EST).
159. Al-Man-i, 2009 WL 564940, at *1. Unlike the Padillacase where the Court
denied Padilla's petition for certiorari on mootness grounds and three Justices
provided a "brief explanatory statement" about the possibility of recurrence, 547
U.S. 1062, 1062 (2006) (mem.) (Kennedy, J., concurring), the Supreme Court's
mootness ruling in al-Marriprovided no such guidance.
160. David G.Savage, They Are 'Enemy Combatants' No More, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14,
2009, at 16.
161. Id.
162. As discussed above, al-Marri, as a legal resident of the United States, may
join Hamdi and Padilla as a U.S. citizen for constitutional purposes in this case.
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President has the power to order the indefinite military detention
of legal residents of the United States who, like al-Marri, did not
take up arms on behalf of an enemy of the United States, and
whose detention is not a fundamental incident of waging war, it is
exceedingly difficult to imagine circumstances in which the
President would be unable to exercise such plenary power. Plainly,
the fundamental rights of all Americans are at risk. Overall, the
potential effect of the Fourth Circuit's divided opinion is farreaching and its logic must be rejected given the court's expansive
and unprecedented definition of the enemy-combatant category.
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